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NOTES
percentage, a statement must be filed pursuant to section 13 (d) and related
SEC regulations.
The application of section 13 (d) in Bath could easily be seen as a fulfill-
ment of the fears of those opposed to the Williams Act-the further
imbalancing of the power relationship of entrenched management and of
dissident shareholders. The use of section 13 (d) protected the interests of
corporate management. It was a weapon to stave off the threat to one man's
job. As to the defendants in Bath, section 13 (d) could be labeled nothing
more than a "tender trap."
G. Lee Hart
Source of Narcotic Drug Determines Validity of
the Presumption of Knowledge of Such Source
Turner v. United States
Turner was convicted on four counts of federal narcotics violations.'
The first and third charged receipt and concealment of heroin and cocaine,
respectively, with knowledge of their unlawful importation into the United
States.! The second and fourth counts charged purchase or distribution of
the same drugs not in or from the original stamped package.' No evidence
of any element except possession was offered by the Government,4 but the
jury returned guilty verdicts on all four counts. The conviction was upheld
by the court of appeals,' and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.' Held: Heroin counts affirmed; cocaine counts reversed: The pre-
sumption that one in possession of heroin knows of its illegal importation is
' The defendant was arrested with two packages in his possession, one containing 14.68 grams
of a mixture containing 5% cocaine, the other containing 48.25 grams of a 15% heroin mixture
packaged in 275 individual glassine bags.
'Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act of 1909, 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964). This statute pro-
hibits the illegal importation of narcotic drugs, or the receipt, concealment, or sale of any drug
which has been illegally imported, with knowledge on the part of the defendant that it was ille-
gally imported. The statute contains the provision that whenever the defendant is shown to have
had possession, "such possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless
the defendant explains the possession to the satisfaction of the jury." Id.
' INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 4704. This statute prohibits purchasing, selling, or distributing
any drug not in or from the original package bearing the tax stamp. The statute provides that
"the absence of appropriate taxpaid stamps from narcotic drugs shall be prima facie evidence of a
violation of this subsection by the person in whose possession the same may be found." Id.
" The presumptions in these statutes are considered necessary because the federal government
has no general criminal jurisdiction under the Constitution. Article 1, § 8 gives the federal gov-
ernment criminal jurisdiction only over piracies and felonies on the high seas, offenses against the
law of nations, and offenses on federal reservations or within federal districts. Congress must there-
fore bring drug possession within the power to regulate trade or the power to lay and collect
taxes in order to make possession a federal offense. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Congress' need to pro-
vide for federal regulation of the drug trade is based on two facts. First, drug laws are difficult
to enforce on any level because drug offenses are victimless crimes and citizen participation in
enforcement is low. Second, the illicit drug trade is largely controlled by organized crime, against
which state authorities are generally ineffective. A. LITTLE, DRUG ABUSE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
49 (1967) (submitted to the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: NARCOTICS AND DRUG ABUSE 7, 12 (1967).
'United States v. Turner, 404 F.2d 782 (3d Cir. 1968).
8395 U.S. 933 (1969).
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valid, because the amount of heroin available from domestic sources is infini-
tesimal. The same presumption is invalid with respect to cocaine, because
some cocaine is available from domestic sources. The presumption that po-
session establishes purchase or distribution of a drug not in or from the
original stamped package is sound with respect to heroin, because there
are no stamped packages of heroin from which the drug might filter into
the drug trade. The quantity and packaging of the heroin involved indicate
that it was not for defendant's own use, but rather for eventual distribu-
tion. The same presumption applied to cocaine is invalid because there are
stamped packages from which cocaine may be obtained, and the amount in-
volved could have been for defendant's own use. Turner v. United States,
396 U.S. 398 (1970).
I. HISTORY OF PRESUMPTION TESTS
Legislation providing that one fact is presumed from another does no
more than enact a rule of evidence, which is within the general power of
government A statutory presumption operates only as an inference of guilt
or liability in the absence of contradicting evidence.8 The power to create
presumptions is, of course, limited by the Constitution. The due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments limit the power of Con-
gress and state legislatures to make the proof of one fact evidence of the
ultimate fact upon which guilt is predicated It is not permissible to estab-
lish a presumption which is "purely arbitrary,"'" or to shift the burden of
proof "by arbitrarily making one fact, which has no relevance to the guilt
of the offense, the occasion of casting upon the defendant the burden of
exculpation."" Thus, a presumption, which relieves the prosecution of the
burden of proving one or more elements of the offense, violates the due
process requirement if it is arbitrary or unreasonable. Certain tests have
been formulated to determine which presumptions fail to meet the due
process mandate.
An early test of the validity of a statutory presumption was announced
in Mobile, Jack-son, &q Kansas City Railroad v. Turnipseed," which involved
a wrongful death action. There, the Supreme Court established the rule that
a presumption must be "reasonable," and there must be a "rational connec-
tion between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed . . . ."3 A
Mississippi statute' provided that injury inflicted by a train was prima facie
evidence of negligent operation. The Court upheld this statute on the
ground that it was not an unreasonable inference that derailment of a train
resulted from some negligence on the part of the railroad. Later, in Ferry
v. Ramsey," the Supreme Court established the rule that a presumption
'Mobile, J., & K.C.R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 42 (1910).
8 Id. at 43.
'Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943).
"Mobile, J., & K.C.R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910).
"Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 469 (1943).
"a219 U.S. 35 (1910).
Is Id. at 43.
41id. at 41-42.
5277 U.S. 88 (1928).
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may be valid if the state might have punished the proven element upon
which the presumption rests, even without the presumed element." A state
statute"' made a bank director personally liable for deposits made when
the director assented to the deposits, knowing the bank to be insolvent. The
director's assent and knowledge of insolvency were presumed. The Supreme
Court held that the presumption was reasonable because the legislature
might have made the bank director liable even without the elements of
assent and knowledge. A third test of a presumption's validity was an-
nounced in Morrison v. California.'8 There, the Supreme Court held that a
presumption is valid if the defendant has more convenient access to the
fact which is presumed than does the state. A California statute" concern-
ing the occupation of land by aliens contained a provision that the allega-
tion of alienage would put the burden upon the defendant to prove his
eligibility for citizenship. The Court upheld the presumption of alienage on
the basis that the defendant had more convenient access to the facts of his
own citizenship than did the state, so the burden of coming forward with
the evidence was not unreasonable.
The Supreme Court made an authoritative statement of its position on
statutory presumptions in Tot v. United States." Tot was convicted under
a federal statute" which prohibited the receipt of firearms shipped in inter-
state commerce by any person who had been previously convicted of a
crime of violence. The statute provided that possession of a firearm by such
a person was sufficient to establish that the weapon had been shipped inter-
state with the defendant's knowledge. The Court reaffirmed the test of
Mobile, adopting the "rational connection" language of that case." How-
ever, the Court was unable to find such a rational connection in Tot and
reversed the conviction. The Court also reduced the Morrison "conven-
ience" test"a to a corollary, holding that convenience alone will not make
a presumption permissible when it fails to meet the rational connection
standard and may subject the defendant to unfairness.
II. APPLICATION OF PRESUMPTION TESTS IN DRUG CASES
Narcotics." Yee Hem v. United States? upheld the presumption of
knowledge of illegal importation with respect to opium. The Supreme
Court applied the "reasonable inference" test of Mobile and held that the
"6 For example, the presumption of knowledge of illegal importation would be valid under this
test if the state could have made mere possession (the proven fact upon which the presumption
rests) a crime.
" 277 U.S. at 93.
18291 U.S. 82 (1934).
19 Id. at 84.
20319 U.S. 463 (1943).
"'Federal Firearms Act § 2(f), 75 Stat. 757 (1961), as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a) (1),
(c), (e)-(i) (Supp. III, 1968).
22 See note 13 supra, and accompanying text.
2 See notes 18-19 supra, and accompanying text.
24 Narcotics are defined in federal prosecutions as any compound of opium, isonipecaine, coca
leaves, or opiates. INT. REV. ConE of 1954, § 4731. Marijuana is defined as a compound derived
from the plant Cannabis sativa L. Id. at § 4761.
2-268 U.S. 178 (1925).
1970]
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inference of knowledge of illegal importation was permissible under a
statute which made the importation of smoking-opium illegal.' Legitimate
possession, the Court observed, was "highly improbable." 7 The Court went
on to note that since defendants knew that opium cannot be lawfully im-
ported," they must be prepared to rebut the "natural inference of unlawful
importation or [their] knowledge of it.""
The section 4704 presumption2" was upheld in Casey v. United States."'
Applying the reasonable inference test once again, the Supreme Court held
that the presumption was permissible because it did no more than thrust
upon defendants the "burden of proving facts peculiarly within their
knowledge and hidden from discovery by the government."'"
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its position on narcotic presumptions in
Roviaro v. United States.' In approving the presumption of knowledge of
importation as applied to heroin, the Court noted that the presumption
does not "shift the burden of proof, but rather places upon the accused
the burden of going forward with his defense."' The Court approved the
presumption based on a reference to Casey and little else.
Marijuana-Leary v. United States." Leary, having been refused entrance
into Mexico, was apprehended with marijuana in his possession. He was
subsequently convicted of failing to pay the marijuana tax' and of trans-
porting and concealing marijuana which had been illegally imported into
the United States.' Knowledge of illegal importation was presumed. In
examining this presumption, the Supreme Court concluded that the test
should be whether the presumed fact "is more likely than not to flow from
the proved fact upon which it is made to depend."" The Court declined to
consider the first element of the presumption, illegal importation itself,
choosing instead to consider at some length the element of knowledge. In
order to sustain the presumption of knowledge the Court stated that it
would be necessary to find that "a majority of marijuana possessors either
are cognizant of the apparently high rate of importation or otherwise have
become aware that their marijuana was grown abroad."' The opinion enu-
merated five possible ways that a possessor might know that his marijuana
was imported,' and then considered the probability of each. The Court
"'Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act of 1909, 21 U.S.C. § 173 (1964).
27 268 U.S. at 184.
"Presumably the defendants were held to know that such importation was illegal on the theory
that ignorance of the law is no excuse.
"268 U.S. at 184.
30 See note 3 supra.
" 276 U.S. 413 (1928).
3aId. at 418.
"353 U.S. 53 (1957).
4Id. at 63.
"5395 U.S. 6 (1969).
'Marijuana Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 4741-45 (1964). The Court's disposition of this count is
the subject of Note, Leary v. United States: Marijuana Tax Act-Self-Incrimination, 23 Sw. L.J.
939 (1969).
'721 U.S.C. § 176a (1964).
28395 U.S. at 36.
39 Id. at 47.
" The five ways enumerated are as follows: (1) The defendant might deduce that his marl-
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concluded that "it would be no more than speculation were we to say that
even as much as a majority of possessors 'knew' the source of their mari-
juana. 41
III. TURNER V. UNITED STATES
The Import Counts. The substance of the Government's case was that
Turner possessed heroin and cocaine. There was no evidence of importation
or of the defendant's knowledge of importation. The Court, upholding the
importation presumption, observed that despite the fact that section 174
has been law since 1909, no evidence had been offered in the many cases
under it, including this one, to indicate that heroin is produced domes-
tically. If such a defense were available, the Court reasoned, defendants
would long ago have discovered and used it. The Court summarily dismissed
the objection that Turner might not have known of the foreign source of
the drug. Those who traffic in heroin, said the Court, are aware of the
foreign source of their commodity unless "they practice a studied ignor-
ance to which they are not entitled."'
With respect to cocaine, the Government conceded that it was reasonable
to infer that the less than one gram of cocaine in Turner's possession had
been stolen from some legitimate source in this country. The Court con-
cluded that, although a greater percentage of the cocaine consumed in this
country is smuggled rather than stolen, the application of the "more likely
than not" standard of Leary required a reversal of the charge of receipt
and concealment of cocaine.
The Tax Violations. The Court then directed its attention to the viola-
tions of section 4704, purchasing or distributing heroin and cocaine not in
or from the original taxed package. The Government pointed out that since
heroin is neither produced in nor legally imported into the United States,
there would be no way to acquire it from a stamped package." The Court
offered alternate theories upon which the purchase or distribution elements
of Turner's conviction might be upheld. First, possession of 275 glassine
bags of heroin "solidly established that Turner's heroin was packaged to
supply individual demands and was in the process of being distrib-
uted .... " If this analysis were rejected, continued the Court, the convic-
tion still could be sustained because heroin is a high-priced product, and
"it would be very unreasonable to assume that any sizable number of pos-
sessors have not paid for it . . . .
The Court then considered the violation of section 4704 with respect to
juana was imported based on his knowledge of the proportion which is produced domestically.
(2) He might have smuggled it himself. (3) He might have learned indirectly that marijuana in
his area or furnished by his supplier is imported. (4) He might have specified foreign marijuana
in making his purchase. (5) He might be able to discern the foreign origin by the appearance,
packaging, or taste of the marijuana. Id.4 1Id. at 53.
42 396 U.S. at 417.
4' Brief for Appellee at 32, Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970).
44 396 U.S. at 420.
4 5 id. at 422.
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cocaine. The evidence established that a significant amount of cocaine is
stolen from legitimate channels, where the drug would in fact bear the
required stamp. The Government's contention that the presumption was
valid because the cocaine involved was not in the form in which it would
be distributed for medicinal reasons" was rejected. The Court also noted
that the amount of the drug involved did not put the defendant in the
position of a trafficker in cocaine. The inference that he had purchased
or was distributing the drug was not considered to follow from the bare
fact of possession.
Turner Contrasted with Leary. Leary represented something of a devia-
tion from the traditional approach of the Supreme Court in previous drug
cases. The statement of the Court in Yee Hem that defendants must be
prepared to rebut the "natural inference" of their knowledge of illegal
importation '7 exemplified the Court's prior attitude toward drug offenders.
Leary charged marijuana possessors with no such "natural inference" of
knowledge. In considering the ways in which one might actually know that
the drug he possessed was imported, the Court modified a stance which had
long charged drug possessors with such knowledge without the benefit of
an individual examination of the facts of each case. Turner, on the other
hand, reverts back to the old line of reasoning. In dismissing the possibility
of lack of knowledge, the Court used an approach strikingly similar to
that in Yee Hem. An impermissible "studied ignorance" of the source of a
drug"s is not far removed from a "natural inference" of knowledge of ille-
gal importation.
The material difference between affirmance of Turner's conviction for
what was in essence possession of heroin and the reversal of Leary's con-
viction for the same offense with respect to marijuana is the amount of
each drug available from sources other than illegal importation. The Leary
Court found that significant portions of marijuana are grown domesti-
cally, 9 while the Court in Turner found that virtually no heroin enters
the drug trade except through illegal importation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Drug laws pose a unique problem to the courts. Turner indicates that
drug statutes will have to be tested for reasonability on a drug-by-drug
basis." Leary rejected the presumption of knowledge of importation as
applied to marijuana; Turner upholds it with respect to heroin and rejects
4 Brief for Appellee at 33, Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970).
4 Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925); see notes 25-29 supra, and accompanying
text.
4 See note 42 supra, and accompanying text.-
"'Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 41 (1969). The Court evidently accepted a ratio of
approximately 90% imported to 10% produced domestically.
" The reversal of the cocaine convictions indicates that the Court will no longer provide a
blanket approval for these laws, as the 'Court itself states with respect to Casey v. United States,
276 U.S. 413 (1928). See note 31 supra, and accompanying text. The Court states that Casey
is limited by Turner so far as it gives general approval to the § 4704 presumption. 396 U.S. at 424.
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